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PREFACE
Recent events in the meat industry have prompted a re-
evaluation of the roles of meat industry participants. In
particular, the role of the New Zealand Meat Producers'
Board has come under a great deal of scrutiny.
This Discussion Paper contributes to this debate by
attempting to guage the reactions of companies and
organisations in the meat industry to possible changes in
the functions of the Meat Producers' Board. In addition,
comment is made on producer involvement in meat marketing.
A survey was undertaken of companies involved in the New
Zealand meat marketing sector. Firms and organisations in
New Zealand, the United States, Germany and the United
Kingdom were visited, and interviewing was done between June
and September 1987.
The study was jointly financed by The Treasury, the Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries and the New Zealand Meat
Producers' Board. However, the views expressed are those of
the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the funding organisations.
A.C. Zwart
DIRECTOR
(v)
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
The past five years have seen substantial change in the New
Zealand meat industry. Control of marketing of New Zealand
meat by the Meat Producers' Board led to changing roles for
many companies and for the Board itself. During this period
incentive systems and constraints under which firms operated
were considerably different from those which existed
previously. Following the resumption of control of
exporting by the companies in December 1985, there has been
a further period of rapid change which is expected to
continue to influence future developments in the industry.
At the same time there have been changes in New Zealand's
regulatory environment, and while this has probably had
relatively little direct influence on the meat industry to
date, there is an increasing possibility of deregulation in
the meat sector.
One of the main objectives of this Discussion Paper is to
describe the changes in both business activities and
attitudes which have occurred in recent years. Information
has been collected from personal interviews with top
executives from private firms and other institutions
associated with the industry. A list of the organisations
interviewed is contained in Appendix 1. These interviews
provided first-hand information on how companies and
organisations have responded to the changing marketing
environment. They also provided an opportunity to identify
key concerns which are perceived to exist within the
industry.
When considering the sheepmeat industry, the role of the New
Zealand Meat Producers' Board must be an underlying concern.
This organisation has seen considerable change in its
structure and functions over the period and its future role
is unclear at present. Other institutions, such as the Meat
Industry Association (MIA), the Market Development Board
(MDB), and Government Departments, have also had a changing
influence on industry behaviour. While this Discussion
Paper does not include recommendations for policy changes,
it does attempt to define logical areas of involvement by
different participants in the industry, and makes some
suggestions as to how producer involvement can be more
clearly defined.
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SECTION 2
INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS, RESPONSES AND ATTITUDES
Section 2.2 of the paper highlights industry changes which
have taken place in the two periods under consideration. In
the first instance, the manner in which the industry
responded during the period of Meat Board controlled export
marketing of New Zealand sheepmeats (from the 1982/83 season
to the 1984/85 season) is briefly documented. Attention is
not focused on the political developments which occurred
during this period, but rather on the manner in which the
export marketing companies responded to the single selling
environment.
Section 2.3 looks in a similar manner at the changes that
have occurred in both behaviour and attitudes since December
1985 when the Meat Producers' Board ceased to be the sole
exporter of New Zealand sheepmeats. This discussion is not
an attempt to review either the performance of the Meat
Producers' Board or the role of a single seller in the
industry. Any attempt to do this without considerably more
detailed analysis could not be justified in light of the
limited period of ownership by the Board. Instead, the
comments below highlight the manner in which firms in the
market place responded to the marketing environment.
2.2 The Influence of Board Control
__•• "__• __ • __ . _ ._. •.__ .• .• •. ,_. __~ no
Perhaps the most marked change which occurred at this time
was a shift in the incentive structure facing the exporting
companies. Because one of the major reasons for the Meat
Board assuming control had been a disagreement over the most
realistic level of prices, it was not surprising that many
companies felt considerable relief at being released from
the burden of establishing market prices and the consequent
financial costs associated with this. As a consequence of
the Board action, individual companies were forced to
reassess their role in the industry. At the time, there was
considerable negotiation between companies, their
representative associations and the Meat Producers' Board.
Although these negotiations were probably inefficient and
could have been avoided if the takeover had been more
carefully planned, they did provide a forum whereby
individual companies could identify specific activities
which might be appropriate in the emerging environment.
- 3 -
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The responses of companies to the changes which were
occurring were somewhat varied, and seemed to depend on the
perceived strengths of their organisations. Marketing
infrastructures already in place were also a consideration.
Most companies withdrew resources from the marketing area
and in some cases, cut down overseas staff and agencies. At
the same time, increased effort appears to have been
expended in areas in which the companies still retained some
control. The most obvious of these were processing and
marketing of by-products and the development of further
processed products.
Companies were also quick to seek out opportunities to act
as agents on behalf of the Board. The wide range of
activities which individual companies performed included
buying stock, storing meat, cutting and packing of primal
cuts, and acting as sales agents in specific countries. The
last mentioned activity was of major concern to companies
who sought to retain agency agreements which utilised
traditional linkages. Naturally, many companies expressed
considerable concern over the loss of their contacts in
overseas markets, and the uncertainty which prevailed in
this situation was also felt by importers and other agents
in those markets.
FurtherP:roces§ing
Perhaps one of the more dramatic changes which occurred at
this time was the increased development of further processed
meat products. Under Board control this was seen as one
area in which companies could retain a role in the market
place and enhance their profitability. There was
considerable negotiation between the Board and the companies
about the price which should be paid for the raw product
input into further processing and eventually this appeared
to settle at a level below the current carcass price.
Although some companies already had plans for the
development of further processing, the situation which
prevailed provided a further incentive to do so, and by the
end of the Board control period, all companies had access to
facilities for processing and had gained experience in
marketing this type of product. There also appears to have
been some political incentive for such developments, since
increased levels of further processing had been frequently
stated as a major objective of the Board. For many
companies this was seen to be a necessity if they wished to
maintain a role in the marketing of meat. In hindsight,
some companies have suggested that their developments in
- 5 -
this area were somewhat tentative and tended to follow
similar developments in other companies.
The majority of this activity focused on the preparation of
boned or boneless consumer cuts. Some companies however,
were involved in activities which required a further degree
of processing, such as reformed meats and canned meat
products. Whilst there was undoubtedly considerable
investment in this area, not all of these products have
proven to be successful, and in recent years, most companies
have reviewed and refined their approaches to further
processing of sheepmeat products.
Most of the companies interviewed during the study
acknowledge that during this period their overall operations
had been profitable. While some of this profitability was
associated with high levels of throughput, it was also
linked to the nature of the agency agreements that they
entered into with the Producers' Board. The use of fixed
charges for buying, administration, storage, cutting,
packing, and acting as marketing agents for the Board,
meant that incomes were relatively stable. This was aided
by a markedly reduced financing requirement which had been
assumed by the Meat Producers' Board.
However, companies felt that there were considerable costs
involved in this changing role although they were probably
of a less direct nature. The most frequently cited concern
was their loss of contact with agents in the market place,
but even where such contacts were retained, companies were
concerned about the lack of flexibility which they had in
dealing with agents. This related not only to the price of
the product but also their ability to guarantee the source
and quality of product. Concern was also expressed about
the uncertainty of their future, and their role in the
marketplace. It was felt that a considerable amount of time
and effort was expended in negotiating and making
arrangements with the Board.
Only a limited number of buyers or importers were
approached, but their reactions to the period of Board
ownership were mixed. Most companies appreciated the
benefits of price stability and dealing with a reduced
number of agents. The increased level of promotional
activity and the ability to negotiate co-ordinated promotion
was also noted. On the other hand, concerns were expressed
about the loss of traditional agents, and the inability to
- 6 -
control or source product from New Zealand. This meant that
many companies felt that they were obliged to purchase
product over which they had little control.
As noted previously, this discussion is not an exhaustive
analysis of the merits of Board ownership. However, this
period clearly had a major impact on the activities of the
meat companies. It is important to note that despite many
fears at the time, the majority of the companies in the
industry survived. Although this was aided by the
development of the group structure in 1984, their survival
was largely based on their ability to renegotiate their
roles within the industry, and to reorient their
capabilities to the needs of the Board.
This increased level of negotiation and the development of
the group structures has had an impact on subsequent
rationalisation within the industry and the experience
gained by the Meat Board in controlled marketing has flowed
on to the activities of the Meat Industry Association. To
the extent that the presence of Board control increased the
expenditure on further processed product development, it has
provided companies with valuable experience in more
sophisticated areas of marketing and market development.
2. 3 J;lJ9.\l::; tr:y Control
In December 1985, an agreement was reached between the Meat
Producers' Board, the Meat Industry Association and
Government which allowed control of the meat exporting to be
handed back to the private companies. An important element
in this agreement was a requirement that the industry should
ensure that the marketing of meat continue in a co-ordinated
and orderly manner. The companies resumed ownership of meat
product and produced schedules for the purchase of lamb from
producers. With the removal of the protection provided by
the Meat Industry Stabilisation Account, prices to producers
fell dramatically and the companies, in co-operation with
the Meat Board, began the task of disposing of the stocks of
meat which had accumulated. Without going into any details
of the transition arrangements, there has been a gradual
evolution towards the current marketing and processing
structure of the industry. Some of the major trends and
developments which have occurred are discussed below.
In the past two or three years there have been considerable
changes in the structure of the companies in the industry.
- 7 -
The majority of this activity has been in the form of
mergers and takeovers between existing companies. While
some of the activity had been initiated during the period of
Board ownership, it has continued up to the present time.
There were several reasons cited for this activity but the
dominant motivation appears to be the need to ensure access
to meat on New Zealand farms. Other mergers and takeovers
are linked to either acquiring marketing skills or capturing
complementary elements of marketing and processing activity.
In light of the fall in throughput, it is surprising that
little of this activity has resulted in actual closure of
killing facilities. In fact, the only major closure during
the period has been the Whakatu plant in Hawkes Bay. This
closure was effected through an agreement between companies
operating in the area, whereby they agreed to share in the
costs of the closure and to acquire certain parts of the
plant.
Despite the stated overcapacity which exists in the industry
at present, new plants have been built. These have been
largely smaller plants which are claimed to be more
efficient than existing plants. They have been built in
Hawkes Bay, Canterbury, and Southland, which are considered
to be areas well serviced by existing freezing works. Such
plants have been constructed by firms which either have
existing marketing capabilities or have been taken over by
companies with such expertise.
Another interesting aspect of the emerging industry
structure has been the involvement of several larger firms
who entered the industry during the period of Board
ownership. For example, Watties became involved in the
industry through joint activity with the Board and have
retained some ownership in the industry through strategic
shareholding. Challenge Meats also entered the industry at
that time and this company has continued to grow through the
acquisition of processing plants in Southland. They also
have an increasing presence in international marketing.
There have also been changes in the structure of exporting
companies. Almost all of the "independent" exporting
companies who had been involved in the exporting of meat
without owning processing plants have either left the
industry, acquired their own processing facilities, or
merged with other organisations. The major reason given for
these developments was the lack of access to killing
facilities or their inability to have their stock killed
when it suited them. The remaining independent companies
are able to retain access to these facilities through their
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size, or alternatively, by making special arrangements with
individual companies. These changes show that the ff open
door" policy which had been in existence before the Board
ownership period does not appear to operate any longer.
It is commonly accepted within the industry that companies
involved in the marketing of meat should control their own
killing facilities. To this extent the industry is probably
more highly integrated from marketing to killing than it had
been previously. The effect of the changes in company
structure has also increased the level of concentration
within the industry.
Ch~nge§ ~n Marketing
One of the conditions of the Board relinquisJ:ling control
over marketing was that the companies should co~ordinate and
control the marketing of meat. This has largely been
accomplished through the Marketing Committee of the Meat
Industry Association, which is the organisation responsible
for the development of a national meat marketing plan. This
Committee is made up of representatives from the five
"groups", which in turn represent individual companies. The
pasis of the group structure was developed during the Board
ownership period and although rationalisation and tension
between individual companies has led to changes in the
composition of the groups, the structure has remained
intact. Most of the groups have formed financial structures
to assist co-ordination within the groups. A list of the
individual groups and their members is contained in
Appendix 2.
Agreement has been reached between individual companies and
the groups to control marketing behaviour in a wide range of
markets. These agreements cover only the marketing of
carcasses and primal cuts. They contain the fOllowing major
components.
1. All companies are required to produce marketing plans
which indicate anticipated quantities to be marketed in
individual countries. These plans are co-ordinated by
the Committee and agreement reached on likelY shipments.
2. Agreement is also reached on the quantity which should
be sold in single buyer markets such as Iran and Iraq
and other markets which are also considered to be
disposal markets where product is likely to sold at a
lower price.
3. Individual companies are required
disposal roar~ets in proportion to
to provide stock for
their share of the
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national kill. Sales are made by the Meat Marketing
Corporation which is jointly owned by each of the five
groups. The staff of the Meat Marketing Corporation are
responsible for negotiating with the major single buyer
markets such as Iran, but marketing in other countries
may be assigned to individual companies who act as
commission agents for the Corporation.
4. Companies which are unable to supply stock for the
Corporation because of their lack of halal facilities or
their commitment to further processed product, are
required to make a financial contribution to the
Corporation and their share of the stock is acquired
from other companies.
5. Agreement is also reached on
by the voluntary restraint
Although monitoring of these
current low levels of exports
any particular restrictions to
access to markets covered
agreement with the EEC.
quantities is important,
would not seem to require
be imposed.
However, specific agreements do exist for some
countries. In the United Kingdom for example, each of
the five exporting groups is represented by an importing
company and agreement is reached with these importers on
the quantity which should be shipped from New Zealand to
the UK. Market shares are allocated to individual
companies on a pro-rata basis determined by their share
of the national kill. A pro-rata market share system
also operates in France because it is considered that
both this and the UK market are sensitive, and that
indiscriminate marketing could result in changes to the
sheepmeat regime which could disadvantage New Zealand.
6. Other agreements, possibly of a shorter term nature are
also reached for dealing with smaller markets. The
structure seems to provide a mechanism for censuring
companies for indiscriminate marketing behaviour or not
complying with agreements. For example, such behaviour
has resulted in individual companies being banned from
markets for a period of time.
The system which has been briefly described above has
resulted in a high level of co-ordination for the marketing
of carcass meats, and the majority of companies feel that
the system operates effectively, particularly in the U.K.,
although they do acknowledge that pressures exist which
could lead to a breakdown of the system. Reasons stated for
the continued existence of this voluntary arrangement are
that most companies recognise the importance of the
activities of the Meat Marketing Corporation, and also there
is a fear that non-compliance will result in further
Government intervention.
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Another important feature of the current marketing
arrangements is that single selling activity in countries
such as Japan and Canada have been left intact. The
arrangements in Japan were set up under the period of Board
control and it was agreed with the Board that these should
remain. Although there were some reservations. many
companies felt that the Japanese operation is successful.
and because meat is provided from a wide range of companies.
the arrangement is equitable. The Canadian operation has
long been recognised as successful and again. because meat
is purchased on an apparently competitive basis there are
few concerns.
The US market has been of major concern, and following a
review of that market by a group which included Board
representatives, it has been agreed that access should be
opened up. At the moment. individual companies have been
granted approval to operate in the U.S. on a test-market
basis, but it is intended that access should be further
liberalised. Currently, most of the companies are exploring
the opportunities which exist in this market and strategies
are being prepared. The approaches being taken appear to
be reasonably well planned and many individual firms are
involved in negotiation about joint approaches for market
development. At this stage the full extent of these
arrangements is unclear but should be revealed in the near
future.
~y~ther~xo~essing
Marketing of further processed lamb products is not covered
by the marketing arrangements described above. Trade in
these products has continued to increase. and although not
all of the reformed product developments have been
successful, all of the exporting companies now have an
involvement with consumer-ready frozen lamb products in one
form or another. There has also been a substantial increase
in the volume of chilled lamb being exported. and several
companies have made a commitment to the development of this
trade in markets such as the United Kingdom. Japan, and the
United States. In total. these developments have led to
changes in the level and location of processing activity
both in New Zealand and overseas, with the major focus being
on the UK market and continental Europe, particularly West
Germany.
Development of the further processed trade has led to
changing roles for some companies. Most companies recognise
that much of the further processed lamb is relatively
undifferentiated and that brand names used on packaging are
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not consumer brands. At times these products have been
competitive in the market and the situation might appear to
be little different from the commodity trade. At least two
major companies have made substantial investments in
marketing structures by withdrawing from their traditional
arrangements in the United Kingdom and establishing London
offices of their parent companies. In both cases these
companies have also distanced their further processed
product marketing from the commodity trade by handing over
some of their carcass trade to other importing companies.
Only one company appears to have made a substantial
commitment to the development of a consumer brand for which
they are prepared to offer full promotional support.
Other companies utilise individual trade brands, and such
product may be sold through a variety of outlets.
Alternatively, they prepare products to be sold under the
brand of retail outlets. In the UK market, larger
supermarket chains appear to be actively supporting the
development of house brands in co-operation with New Zealand
suppliers.
There has also been increasing investment in more
sophisticated products and it is interesting to note that in
each case, companies involved have utilised overseas
technologies which are highly protected. Currently, the
most important of these is probably the Bernard Matthew Lamb
Roast, a development initiated by the Meat Board. This
product appears to be successful in the United Kingdom
market and plans are under way for it to be launched in both
Canada and Australia.
It was thought by some companies that this product had a
certain advantage through the arrangements by which the meat
was purchased in New Zealand. While it appeared to be
acceptable under Board ownership to supply meat at a
discount for this product, it is felt that this arrangement
should not continue. The same company intends to launch a
range of more conventional frozen lamb cuts in the United
Kingdom market and it is anticipated that the strength of
the brand name, which already covers a wide range of
alternative meat products will ensure the success of the new
products.

SECTION 3
ISSUES
3.1 Market Controls and Access
... _.', ""'--.'--' _._.. _ .. _ ....__ . ._---- .-.-_ ...•
All of the firms and institutions interviewed in this study
felt that some degree of control was necessary to coordinate
and develop the marketing of New Zealand's sheepmeat
products. However, many of the firms felt that these
controls would not be necessary in the long term if the
supply and demand imbalance can be overcome. They felt that
the activities of the Meat Marketing Corporation are
essential in maintaining reasonable prices in other markets
around the world. The few firms who opposed this idea did
so because they dealt mainly in further processed products
and they could see no reason to contribute to disposal
markets. This argument is probably short-sighted because
the release of that product onto the world markets would
also influence prices for further processed products.
Most companies also felt that the group importing system
operating in the United Kingdom market was an important part
of the current market structure. It is argued that this
system stablises the prices in the United Kingdom which then
has spin-off effects in other markets which use this market
as a price barometer. It was argued that it was important
to retain a responsible level of price to ensure that EEC
policy makers would not alter the sheepmeat regime to
penalise imports from New Zealand.
Although these arguments are obviously important, the fact
that New Zealand sales in these markets have fallen
dramatically in the last few years cannot be ignored. Many
reasons are cited for this phenomenon including the increase
in local production, the spread of that production, the
level of generic promotion, and pricing strategies. It is
difficult to identify the causes of this market decline
without a considerable amount of very detailed research, but
it does appear that the UK market may be particularly
sensitive to price differentials between New Zealand lamb
and domestic lamb, particularly in the earlier part of the
year. It has been suggested that a misjudgement of price
setting by the Board in early 1985 led to a substantial dro~'
in sales, but the same situation appeared to occur in 1987.
The lack of coordinated promotional activity which occurred
after the Board stepped out of the market has also been
suggested as a possible cause. Although promotional
activity had been continued, it was apparently at a
relatively low level and is only beginning to become
- 13 -
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functional again through the activities of the newly formed
Lamb Promotional Council. This Council is made up of the
five importing groups and the Meat Board with funding
provided from the Board and also a levy on all imports of
1.5 p per kilo.
Some of the individual companies also felt that increased
coordination was required in markets such as Spain. Portugal
and Germany. It was stated that difficulties in the
Mediterranean markets are related to the political
consequences of flooding relatively small and recently
opened markets.
In Germany, concern was expressed at the intense level of
competition between relatively similar branded further
processed product. While it was stated that prices in this
market had fallen and consumption was down this does not
appear to be evident in the export statistics for the year
ended during 1987. The intensity of competition led some
firms to suggest that controls should be imposed on this
market or that a limited number of licences should be
issued. However. other companies felt that the current
situation was only temporary and would be solved by moves
towards rationalisation of ownership in New Zealand.
Increased levels of competition in some of these markets is
not surprising when the level of control over world markets
is considered. Using export statistics for the year ended
June 1987 it can be shown that all bone in lamb exports
which are allocated to market on a pro-rata basis (UK,
France and Meat Marketing Corporation markets) account for
65% of total exports. If the single seller markets (Canada r
United States and Japan) are also included, 72% of the
export markets could be considered to be controlled. When
exports to other EEC countries. which are also closely
monitored because of voluntary restraint agreements, are
included this figure rises to 84% of New Zealand's bone-in
lamb exports.
In this controlled environment it is not surprising that
there could be intense competition in the smaller and newly
developing markets. This situation must also put
considerable pressure on the markets for further processed
lamb which are not covered by the pro-rata arrangements.
Thus, a situation such as that which has arisen in Germany
is hardly surprising. This may also explain the high level
of interest in the opening up of the United States market.
This situation could worsen if the activities of the
exporters are further coordinated to overcome problems in
the remaining free markets.
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It is frequently stated by exporters that in order to
compete with other companies for the purchase of stock in
New Zealand, they need to be able to explore every
opportunity which arises in the market. In this case it is
not surprising that firms might agree to accept a pro-rata
share in each of the carcass markets. However, in the
extreme, such a strategy would have an undesirable influence
on the stability of smaller markets, and would adversely
affect the incentive for firms to invest in marketing
activities aimed at increasing market share.
3.2 Single Seller Markets
The single seller markets of Canada, united States and Japan
account for less than 10% of the total market for New
Zealand lamb, but it should be noted that Japan is still one
of the largest single markets. It is difficult to make
comparisons between these three situations as the
institutions used to develop the markets, and the market
environments themselves, vary considerably.
Most of the firms felt that the Canadian market was
operating efficiently because it was well managed and the
concentration of the supermarket chains in the country
suited that style of selling.
While the companies acknowledge the growth of sales in the
Japanese market, there were still reservations expressed
about controls over access. These concerns carne mainly from
companies who had previously had agents in that market, or
alternatively those who felt that they could compete in the
development of sophisticated products. It is an important
feature of this market that supplies of further processed
product are purchased from a range of companies, some of
whom are not shareholders in Janmark. This makes it
possible for Janmark to ensure that the most suitable
product can be purchased for the market.
Almost all of the companies interviewed stated that they had
an interest in marketing products in the United States and
had either made exploratory trips to the market or applied
for test marketing licences. It was agreed that while Devco
had made a substantial commitment to developing the image of
New Zealand lamb in that market, it had generally been
unsuccessful in exploring all of the opportunities. Reasons
stated for these problems include the instability in
management, the difficulties of a single organisation
handling a dispersed market and also the excessive direction
and manipulation of the market from New Zealand.
It is interesting to compare this organisation with that
which has been operating in Japan. In the latter case, the
majority of the marketing decisions and product purchase
decisions are made from the market place which ensures that
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only the correct products for the market are shipped. The
control of the American market from New Zealand did not
appear to allow for such opportunities to be exploited, and
it was felt that an inappropriate product had often been
shipped.
Even though most companies agreed that the market should be
opened up, they felt that controls over access should be
continued. The reasons for this included concerns about
political reactions from domestic producers, the need to
capitalise on the activity of the Devco investment, and also
the size of the financial commitment which would be required
to develop that market.
3.3 Atti tude~ to the Rqle of the_~.2"~r<t~ng. Other
Agencies
As described above, many companies suggested that there was
a need for export licensing to control marketing behaviour.
Among those companies who supported licensing, there were
divided opinions as to who should actually perform this
role. Possibilities mentioned were the Board, Government
Departments, the industry itself, or a combination of these
three groups. There was an awareness of problems which
could arise as a result of lobbying activity, and in some
cases, the need to police licensing or market allocation
procedures was suggested, with the Board possibly fulfilling
this function. It was recognised that it was necessary for
some agency to be involved in market access negotiations and
monitoring of VRA's, but again, opinion was divided as to
whether this was the responsibility of the Government or the
Board.
There was virtually no support for a Board presence in
freight negotiations as it was felt that these were the
responsibility of the Meat Industry Association or
individual companies. There was fairly general agreement
that any generic promotion should be carried out by the
Board, but concerns were expressed about its effectiveness
in increasingly diversified markets. Grading was also seen
to be an acceptable function, while it was felt that quality
assurance could be provided by Government or'the Board.
Of particular interest was the overwhelming support for a
Board role in collecting and providing generic information
to all sectors of the industry. There was some feeling that
the Board should even move beyond such an information
gathering function to a monitoring and overview role in the
industry.
However, with the move towards more sophisticated marketing
activity, companies have become somewhat concerned about the
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commercial sensitivity of marketing plans, and are becoming
increasingly reluctant to share such information with bodies
such as the Board. This is particularly so given the
perceived relationship between the Board and Freesia
Investments. Freesia is a Board owned investment company
which will be used to undertake strategic investments in
specific companies at both the processing and marketing
levels.
Although some participants welcomed a monitoring role, there
was agreement that the Board should not attempt to be both a
referee and a player in the industry. Some companies
expressed concern about the fact that an organisation with
specific sectoral responsibilities such as a producers'
Board, had the ability to regulate activity in other sectors
of the industry. Freesia was viewed with a great deal of
suspicion, and despite Board assurances to the contrary,
many companies seem to believe that Freesia or Freesia-
backed companies, will be looked upon more favourably when
it comes to allocation of access to restricted markets.

SECTION 4
CONTROLS IN MARKETS
It is apparent from the discussion in previous sections that
concern about controls in the marketplace extend beyond the
role of the Meat Producers' Board. The single selling
activities of the Board have been replaced by an industry
controlled structure that carries out similar functions, but
with a very different administrative system. This structure
includes a mechanism of allocating quantities and access
rights to individual carcass markets. The system ensures
equitable treatment for all companies through a complex
arrangement of pro-rata allocations and financial transfers.
These are controlled by agreements between and within
marketing groups.
The arrangements are voluntary but appear to be supported by
government departments, the Meat Producers' Board, and the
Market Development Board, who actively promote the need for
a coordinated approach to orderly marketing. While there
are pressures within the group structure, particularly from
firms who may wish to have a more specialised role in the
market, recent moves to strengthen the arrangements have
occurred. Many companies felt that further coordination
could be achieved through meetings at the Chief Executive
level rather than through their appointees to the Meat
Industry Association's Marketing Committee. Meetings at
this level have already been held, and more are planned for
the future, apparently with a high level of cooperation.
Although further processed product is not included in these
arrangements, there has been monitoring of volumes shipped
to individual markets, and the need to control these markets
through licensing has been suggested by some companies. This
desire to further extend controls is also reflected in many
of the concerns expressed about the need for controlled
development of the US market.
A voluntary market sharing cartel of this type does not
preclude price competition between the companies. Firms
would be expected to maximise their individual returns from
allocated markets, and expand their share of the kill in New
Zealand through offering higher relative farm gate prices.
The major concern with this system, however, relates to its
effect on the level of overall marketing activity in the
carcass markets. Because market sharing arrangements
guarantee access and a fixed share in a market place, the
major emphasis must be on relative performance rather than
absolute price levels in a particular market. In this
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situation there is a reduced incentive to increase a firm's
share in the market place or even the total market for New
Zealand lamb in a particular market. Therefore, a company's
ability to specialise in a particular market or to
unilaterally expand the size of that market must be affected
by these arrangements. It should be noted that a firm's
share of the New Zealand kill is no indication of their
efficiency or ability to market in an individual country and
this point was made by some individual companies.
Another concern must be the barriers which the current
arrangements could impose on new firms wishing to enter the
industry. Although there are no regulatory restrictions to
entry other than the qualitative requirements for
processing activities, it is unclear how a new entrant would
enter the group structure. It is apparent that existing
members of the Association would not wish to support new
entrants. and they may be in a position to act jointly in
this regard. It has been stated that it would be very
difficult for a new company which did not own a killina
facility to justify a position in the group system. The
most obvious means of entry would be to acquire an existing
firm with killing facilities, or to construct a killing
facility which might link up with existing marketinq
facilities. The most difficult avenue of entry would be for
a firm which wished to only acquire carcass meats for
further processing or marketing.
The continued use of single selling organisations in some
markets provides a contrast to the structure described
above. Rather than providing exporting firms with a
representation in each market, the single selling
organisation provides a focus for a specific market. This
provides a greater degree of control in the market but does
not guarantee each firm access to that market. However,
existing organisations of this type are all jointly owned by
some combination of private companies and the Meat Board_
It is unclear what the objectives of such organisations
should be. On the one hand. they could concentrate on
maximising returns to the owner companies by paying the
highest possible price for product which is used in that
market. Alternatively, the organisation could act as an
independent firm and attempt to purchase product for the
market at the lowest possible prices and maximise returns to
the owner companies by paying high dividends. It is clear
that the type of approach taken can affect the behaviour of
the organisation. For example, in the latter case, the
single selling firm would presumably be more prepared to
purchase product from a wider variety of sources includinq
non-shareholder companies, in order to meet market
requirements and maximise its returns.
The apparent difficulties with
in the United States market
the New Zealand Lamb Company
highlights the need for such
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organisations to be based in the market place, and to have
clear objectives and incentive structures. Where such
institutions are to be maintained it is necessary to ensure
that their management is contestable and that all potential
suppliers have access to the market. The present ownership
of these firms has been determined by historical factors and
has been influenced by the Meat Board's involvement. It may
be necessary in the future to consider alternative means of
organising such markets.
One common proposal for granting access rights is to use a
method of tendering to grant rights to individual firms or
groups of firms for a particular period of time. Thus, firms
which feel that they are best able to maximise the returns
from the market would be prepared to tender the highest
price. This system is commonly suggested in situations
where access to the market may be particularly valuable to
the individual company. However, it is frequently argued
that the limited life of such tenders can limit marketing
activity as it may not allow continuity of involvement
between tendering periods.
An alternative to tendering might be appropriate in markets
where there does not appear to be scope for capturing prices
higher than world price levels, but where concern exists
about the managed growth of the market. This would be to
grant access rights to a particular company, while ensuring
that ownership of such limited access companies is
tradeable. Such firms could be independent trading entities
able to purchase meat from any source in New Zealand, but
shares in them should be accessable to all the individual
exporting companies. Such a mechanism would provide
incentives for managers to perform and would allow access to
the most suitable product for the market. It would also
enable companies with the most appropriate marketing
initiatives to influence the management. The continuous
trading of shares would overcome some of the discontinuities
associated with tendering. These same general principles
could apply in any market where access is licensed or
constrained in any way, and is not necessarily restricted to
single seller markets.
One of the key concerns in the current market situation is
whether or not market access should be constrained in any
way, and if so, who should be responsible for making this
decision. These are obviously major questions and can only
be answered with a far more detailed analysis of the market
environments and their response to differing marketing
strategies. For example, it is not immediately obvious
whether a single selling firm with contestable ownership
would be more or less effective or efficient in a market
place than the voluntary market sharing cartel arrangement
currently used in some countries.
However, it is possible to make some comments about who
should be responsible for making this type of decision.
This issue is addressed in the following section which
describes the role in the market place which might be
appropriate for producer organisations.

SECTION 5
PRODUCER INVOLVEMENT IN MARKETING
Most of the companies interviewed in this study felt that
producer organisations do have a role in the market place.
While there was some disagreement about the specifics of
this role, there was more support for their involvement in
activities such as generic promotion, information gathering
and the setting of grade specifications, than there was for
activities such as freight negotiations and licensing.
Particular concerns were expressed about their involvement
in licensing where this might also be linked to their
ability to undertake their own strategic investment in the
market.
This response shows that there is little concern about a
Board allocation of producer funds to activities which are
of benefit to the general development of the industry.
However, the ability of a producer Board to coerce firms in
sectors of the industry not involved in production did cause
some consternation among the companies interviewed. Such a
response is not surprising, and gives some sort of
indication as to how demarcation of producer board
involvement might be approached.
Activities such as promotion and research where producer
funds are invested in a manner which influences market
behaviour, and consequently increases producer incomes, may
be acceptable. Likewise, a producer organisation might
choose to make strategic investments in individual firms or
through targetted promotional activities. While these
activities will undoubtedly influence the market, and
possibly the behaviour of other firms in the industry, they
do not alter the property rights of the marketing firms or
restrict their decision making in any way.
It does not appear to be appropriate for a producer
controlled organisation to be in a position to make
decisions that coerce firms which are not members of the
producer organisation. The ability to control membership of
the wider industry, or to penalise activity in the market
place which is not in the national interest, should be the
responsibility of the government rather than a producer
group. Many activities which are not considered to be in
the national interest are covered by existing legislation
such as the Commerce or Fair Trading Acts. However, if
additional restrictions such as licensing are required,
these would be most appropriately controlled by an
organisation which represents the government interest.
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with such an allocation of responsibilities, both the 
government and the producer board would still have an 
incentive to monitor market behaviour and collect market 
information. The producer organisation may wish to invest 
in monitoring which will not only aid individual producer 
decision making but will also guide the investment and 
expenditure patterns of the Board itself. The Government on 
the other hand, would have an interest in monitorinq and 
supervising property rights which have been allocated. At 
present, a considerable amount of this information gathering 
activity has been carried out by the Board. However, if the 
Board does decide to undertake more strategic investment in 
the market, then only the government may be in a position to 
collect the information required to monitor some industry 
activities. 
A similar principle of demarcation can be used to allocate 
roles in lesser activities. For example, although it may be 
appropriate for a producer group to develop a grading system 
which can aid both producers and exporters in describing the 
most desirable characteristics of carcasses, it would be the 
government's responsibility to administer any minimum export 
standards. While a producer-developed grading scheme does 
not impose upon the property rights of the exporting 
companies, minimum export standards which might limit their 
ability to participate in the market place or to trade in 
specific products is clearly a national rather than a 
producer decision and thus a responsibility of Government. 
This discussion has attempted to define a general role for a 
producer organisation in a marketplace. By handing over 
statutory or semi-regulatory roles which impinge on other 
sectors of the industry to the Government, they may remove 
any difficulties associated with their ability to invest in 
the marketplace. 
A producer board which raises funds by levies on its members 
would possess the ability to invest these financial 
resources to the best advantage of the contributors. In 
some cases, this might involve support for cooperative or 
generic activities which attempt to benefit all other 
members of the industry, but in other cases, they might 
choose to target this investment in such a way that it 
stimulates activities in specific markets or even specific 
firms. This can be viewed as a more strategic role in the 
industry and is quite a different one from that of a 
coordinator or regulatory agent. 
It has been suggested that a producer controlled 
organisation should not even have the statutory authority to 
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collect levies from individual producers. It is argued that 
enforced levy collection is coercive, since all producers 
are required to contribute, regardless of the individual 
benefits which they receive. Proponents of this view 
contend that if there are sufficient benefits from joint 
producer activity, then individuals should be prepared to 
voluntarily support a levy collection system. In reality 
however, the cost of maintaining a voluntary organisation 
with a group as diverse as livestock producers is likely to 
be extremely high. Without going into any detailed 
technical arguments, it should be noted that it can be 
economically efficient to minimise the transaction cost of 
maintaining group activity through the granting of rights to 
collect levies. 
A key concern in the granting of such rights however, is the 
ability of producers to ensure that the size of levies and 
forms of expenditure are appropriate. In a voluntary 
association, this is normally guaranteed by an individual's 
decision about whether or not to participate. However, with 
a statutory body, such as a producer board t this can only be 
managed through a system in which the managers of the Board 
are elected by producers, and their activities subsequently 
monitored. 
The representative nature of the Meat Producers' Board and 
also the Electoral Committee system by which those members 
are appointed should play an important role in ensuring that 
the activities undertaken by the Board are the most 
appropriate ones. This ability of individual producer 
members to regulate the activities of their representatives 
is evident in many industries in New Zealand. The fact that 
not all producer Boards have utilised the full extent of 
their statutory powers, and at times have dramatically 
changed their approach to market intervention is evidence of 
this fact. 
In summary, this final section of the report has attempted 
to define some logical areas of producer involvement in 
marketing activities. This has resulted in a suggested 
allocation of responsibilities which more clearly defines 
the respective roles both of a producer board and of the 
Government. 

APPENDIX I
LIST OF COMPANIES/ORGANISATIONS SURVEYED
lYf}!f.Z~~lflIJg
Alliance Freezing Co (Southland) Ltd
Auckland Farmers' Freezing Co-op Ltd
Challenge Meats Ltd
Fortex Group Ltd
Freesia Investments Ltd
Janmark Inc/ANZCO
Mathias Meats NZ Ltd
Meatex NZ Ltd
Meat Marketing Corporation
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
New Zealand Market Development Board
New Zealand Meat Industry Association (Inc)
New Zealand Meat Producers' Board
Primary Producers' Co-operative Society Ltd
Producer Meats Ltd
W Richmond Ltd
Treasury
Waitaki International Ltd
Weddel Crown Corporation Ltd
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USA
New Zealand Lamb Coy. Inc.
New Zealand Meat Producers' Board
Safeway Stores Inc
Tupman Thurlow Ltd
_Germany
Kommunikation
Prime Meats Ltd
llniJfL(L KinggQm
A.N.Z.F. (UK) Ltd.
Bernard Matthews pIc
Challenge Meats Ltd
J.S. Dewhurst Ltd
International Meat Trade Association
NZ Lamb Co. Ltd.
New Zealand Lamb Promotional Council
New Zealand Meat Producers' Board
J. Sainsbury, pIc
Towers & Co. Ltd.
Waitaki (London) Ltd
w. Weddel & Co
APPENDIX 2
COMPOSITION OF NEW ZEALAND EXPORT MARKETING GROUPS
AS AT 5 DECEMBER 1986
GROUP A
._._--_ .._---_.__.-
Crosby Exports Limited
Challenge Meats Limited
Fresha Export Limited & Co
Oceanic Exports NZ Limited
Riverlands Foods Limited
Auckland Farmers Freezing Co-op Limited
Alliance Freezing Co (Southland) Limited
Brooklands FBM Limited
W.H. Groves & Sons Limited
Fortex Group Limited
Meatex Limited
Primary Producers Co-operative Society Limited
Producers Meats Limited
C. Sullivan NZ Limited
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GROUP D
Columbia Exports Limited
Crown Meat Exports Limited
J.W. Hartnell Limited
Kerr Exports Limited
MacDonald Trading Corporation Limited
Mathias Meats NZ Limited
w. Richmond Limited
Weddel-Crown Corporation Limited
T.H. Walker & Sons Limited
Advanaced Meats Limited
Ballande (NZ) Limited
Mair Foods Limited
C.S. Stevens & Company Limited
Tara Exports Limited
Waitaki International Limited
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